

## APPENDIX 15

### (SOUTH CAROLINA LONG-TERM POWER OUTAGE PLAN) TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

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#### I. INTRODUCTION

- A. As required by state and federal law, South Carolina’s policy is to be prepared for any emergency or disaster, including long-term power outage (LTPO). A LTPO is any persistent interruption in electric service that lasts longer than typical outages at the distribution level, extending from several days to weeks.
- B. South Carolina State Regulations 58-1 and 58-101 require contingency plans and implementing procedures for major hazards, such as long-term power outage, coordinated by the State with counties that have a potential of being impacted.

#### II. PURPOSE

- A. Provide a framework for response and recovery from the effects of a LTPO on the state’s population and lifeline sectors.
- B. Define roles and responsibilities for intergovernmental and State Emergency Response Team (SERT) members to save lives, protect property, and assist the private sector in facilitating their ability to recover from a long-term power outage.
- C. Identify key intersections of the state’s lifeline sectors to help decision-makers prioritize essential functions and facilities and to facilitate response and recovery efforts.

#### III. SCOPE

- A. Since a LTPO can be caused by a variety of hazards, it is expected that this plan will often be implemented alongside another plan addressing the specific type of hazard causing the power outage. Therefore, this plan focuses on activities and concerns that relate to the lack of electrical power only.
- B. This plan is limited to power outages lasting for long durations. Therefore, short-term and intermittent power outages (i.e., rolling brownouts) are not discussed.
- C. The SC LTPO plan works in conjunction with the ESF-12 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP serves as a guide for state and local officials to monitor key energy data elements to coordinate with energy providers in restoring the balance between the supply and demand of energy.

#### IV. FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Facts
  - 1. South Carolina is serviced by four major energy providers, twenty electric cooperatives, and twenty-one municipal electric utilities.

2. The state’s major energy providers and many of the cooperatives provide power to multiple jurisdictions.
3. All electric utilities, regardless of ownership, size, or structure, have emergency plans and contingency plans for short-term power outages.
4. South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) has no organic backup generator capability and will fulfill any external requests for backup power via contract or federal resource request.

**B. Assumptions**

1. Wide-ranging effects impacting an entire or multiple electric grids will severely limit and/or degrade the ability of energy providers to share power and restoration resources.
2. A LTPO of the scope and magnitude requiring interagency coordination will be caused by a major incident necessitating federal support.
3. The potential for simultaneous disruptions over large areas of the country could limit or eliminate mutual aid as a response option.
4. Bulk Electric Systems (BES) outside of outage areas will be limited or degraded.
5. Mutual aid resources among investor-owned, public power, and cooperative electric utilities will be overextended.
6. Damage to certain components of the electric transmission system could delay power restoration efforts and cause longer estimated restoration time-lines due to significant just-in-time supply chain issues.
7. Black start operations will be required to re-energize the grid and restore electricity. See Section VI.B.2.b for details.
8. The likely loss of communications capabilities will have devastating cascading effects for both emergency response and the electric utility’s work to balance restoration of the grid.
9. Supply chain integrity will be compromised and existing processes for support to impacted populations will not be sufficient.
10. Transportation management systems will be affected and will inhibit consumer and commercial movement.
11. If an additional incident occurs during a LTPO, it will compound the effects and timeline for restoration of power.

12. Response and recovery support and capabilities will be limited, forcing the State to determine resource priorities.
13. Water and wastewater operations will be hindered and affect delivery of essential services.
14. A LTPO will affect the ability of healthcare facilities and mass care facilities to provide heating, ventilation, air conditioning, feeding, equipment sterilization, and sanitation.
15. Back-up generators will fail at some facilities due to improper or infrequent maintenance or lack of fuel.
16. Impacted areas will observe large-scale economic disruption; some businesses will not recover from a LTPO.
17. Individuals affected by a LTPO may lose their source of income or be unable to access funds, requiring social service support.

## V. SITUATION

- A. South Carolina is vulnerable to a wide array of natural and man-made hazards that could lead to a long-term power outage. Some events that could result in a LTPO in South Carolina include:
  1. Man-Made
    - a. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
    - b. Significant Cyber Incident
    - c. Coordinated Physical Assault/Terrorism
    - d. Unintentional Human Error
    - e. Disruption to Natural Gas Pipeline
  2. Naturally Occurring
    - a. High Magnitude Earthquake
    - b. Hurricanes
    - c. Geomagnetic Disturbance/Space Weather
- B. LTPO response will involve two concurrent operational efforts: the restoration of power and lifesaving and life-sustaining efforts.

1. Restoration of power is a responsibility that resides with the electric utilities. If the need for state engagement for energy restoration efforts arises, ESF-12 will coordinate those efforts. However, electric utility companies will maintain operational control over restoration efforts.
  2. Concurrently, SCEMD and SERT partners will coordinate state level response actions to emergent issues in support of counties and energy providers during a LTPO, including lifesaving and life-sustaining efforts.
- C. Additional considerations for electromagnetic incidents:
1. Electromagnetic incidents (including electromagnetic pulse and geomagnetic disturbance) can disrupt unprotected electronic infrastructure equipment and devices, particularly semiconductor components, causing them to not function normally until cycled in power. Equipment and devices may also be damaged through a surge in voltage or current, requiring repair or replacement before being operable again.
  2. Electromagnetic incidents will have a very different damage footprint than other disasters and LTPOs. There will be greater compromise of any unprotected electronic equipment, devices, and systems (especially from an EMP). Much of the physical damage will be internal and not immediately obvious. In some cases, systems and equipment may have merely tripped off-line and shut down but remain undamaged.
  3. Equipment, devices, and systems impacted by an electromagnetic incident will need to be repaired or replaced before being operational again; this includes components of electrical generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure, as well as end-user consumption equipment and devices in certain EMP incidents.
  4. In the event that an electromagnetic incident renders equipment, devices, and/or systems at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) unusable, a manual/paper system will be used to continue response operations in accordance with the SEOC SOP.

## **VI. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

### **A. Plan Activation**

1. This plan could be activated when the following conditions are present:
  - a. At the direction of the Governor or Governor's designee.
  - b. By the SCEMD Director upon notification from ESF-12 that conditions consistent with a LTPO have or will be reached.

- c. When South Carolina Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (SC CIC) provides warning of a pending or cyber incident in progress aimed at the energy sector.
2. This plan may be implemented alone or in conjunction with a plan written to address the specific hazard causing the LTPO (e.g., Hurricane Plan, Earthquake Plan).

B. Operational Phases




Figure 1: Operational Phases Timeline

1. Phase 1: Normal Operations

This phase is associated with preparedness actions that take place prior to the occurrence of a LTPO. This includes:

- a. Participation in long-term power outage planning, training, and exercises, including planning, training, and exercises for electromagnetic incidents.
- b. Pre-incident mission analysis to identify potential risks, priority electrical systems, and resource gaps.
- c. Engaging in mitigating electromagnetic hardening actions that protect critical infrastructure, equipment, and devices, improve resilience, and enhance continuity of operations.

2. Phase 2: Response

a. This phase begins with the onset of the LTPO and continues until impacted electricity infrastructure is restored, facilitating continuous delivery of service to impacted jurisdictions and the interdependent community lifeline sectors.

b. Phase 2a: Activation and Initial Response

- 1. During Phase 2a, state and local responders conduct assessments and initiate response actions in support of

saving and sustaining lives, while electric utilities work to restore power through the transmission network or employing black start contingency plans as needed.

- a. Black start is the process of restoring an electric power station or part of the electric grid to operation without relying on the external electric power transmission network (see Figure 2 below). While large electric utilities can utilize black start to restore the power grid, smaller co-ops rely on purchasing power from the larger utilities.

### Black Start System Restoration Process




Figure 2: Black Start Restoration Process

- b. Once a black start generating facility is restored, power is provided to other plants so they can begin the start-up process and form service islands (Phase 2b). The entire black start process can take 7-10 days or more.
- c. Due to the complicated nature of black start power restoration, decisions on priorities of generation restoration are made by the electric utility and based on the balancing of loads within the power grid. The

SERT cannot prioritize locations for generation restoration.

2. The initial priority for SERT partners is developing situational awareness, including assessing communications with county emergency operations centers, stakeholders, and federal partners. Additionally, SERT partners will:
  - a. Identify priority lists of facilities in need of temporary emergency power (i.e., generators and fuel).
  - b. Coordinate transportation of fuel supplies into impacted areas for responders, in accordance with the [SC Emergency Refuel Plan](#) (Appendix 9 to the SC Emergency Operations Plan [SCEOP]).
  - c. Begin developing plans for commodity distribution, sheltering, and medical facility support once service islands have been established (Phase 2b).
3. If the LTPO is caused by an electromagnetic incident, an additional priority for both electric utility and SERT response is to identify and evaluate equipment and devices which are damaged and need to be repaired/replaced prior to power being restored.

c. Phase 2b: Sustained Response – Service Islands

1. Phase 2b begins when electric utilities have brought on enough power to establish temporary service islands – locations with the energy necessary for delivery of lifeline sector services.
  - a. As more service islands are brought online, they are progressively synchronized to form electrical sub-systems. Tie lines are closed and utilities can begin restoring the remainder of the customer load.
  - b. The timing of establishment of service islands will be highly variable and unpredictable based on the situation. Collapses during restoration could occur.
2. Activities started during Phase 2a will continue. Once service islands are established, the SERT will additionally:
  - a. Establish Commodity Points of Distribution (CPOD) locations in support of continuous and sustained

commodity delivery to the affected population, in accordance with the [SC Logistics Plan](#) (Attachment A to the SCEOP).

- b. Coordinate the relocation of patients as needed to healthcare facilities in service islands with power.
  - c. Work with Department of Public Health and ESF-6 to coordinate medical needs shelter (MNS) relocation, as necessary, into facilities within functioning service islands.
3. Phase 3: Recovery
- a. In Phase 3, response activities transition to short-term and long-term recovery operations. This transition may be initiated and conducted simultaneously with response activities in Phase 2b.
  - b. The private sector and local, state, and federal governments engage together to restore services and the supply chain, continue government operations, and promote economic recovery following a LTPO. See the [SC Recovery Plan](#) (Appendix 6 to the SCEOP) for more information.

## VII. DISASTER INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS

- A. See Section VIII (Disaster Intelligence and Communications) of the SCEOP [Base Plan](#).
- B. Lifeline Sector Analysis
  - 1. The table below lists possible impacts to the state’s lifeline sectors associated with a LTPO. While not all-inclusive, this list assists the SERT’s ability to respond effectively by proactively identifying possible areas of concern before impacts occur.
  - 2. Expanded tables detailing critical information requirements and potential decision points can be found in Annex 1 (Impacts to Community Lifeline Sectors), along with charts illustrating the interconnectivity between lifeline sectors.

Lifeline	Scope of Possible Impacts
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The ability to maintain critical emergency services during disasters will be impeded due to cascading impacts from communications failure, lack of clean water, and impacts to the transportation sector.</li> <li>• An increase in house fires is possible from improper use of generators.</li> <li>• Water utilities may not be able to provide proper water pressure for fire suppression.</li> <li>• Commercial and residential security/alarm systems without battery backup will not work.</li> <li>• The inability to pump fuel will impact responder vehicle fleets.</li> <li>• Impacts to responder communications will affect ability of dispatch to coordinate response.</li> <li>• Additional security personnel will be needed to manage traffic at non-functioning signals, escort fuel shipments, and/or secure critical facilities.</li> <li>• Security/controlled access systems without backup power will need additional support to properly secure government buildings/other secure areas.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transportation limitations and supply chain disruptions will make it difficult to open shelters, prepare food, distribute food and emergency supplies, and provide means for reunification services.</li> <li>• Mass care needs will increase each day as more people lack electricity, food, and/or water.</li> <li>• Disruption in agribusiness is likely and includes production, harvest, manufacturing, and retail. This will have cascading impacts on employment, tax revenues, and commerce.</li> <li>• Disruptions in agribusiness may cause loss of availability to human food, animal feed, and non-food agricultural products (including forestry and timber products).</li> <li>• Impacts to temperature-controlled facilities related to human food and animal feed may cause increased challenges for maintaining public health and animal health standards for those commodities.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of clean water will lead to degradation of critical medical functions.</li> <li>• Acute care hospitals with emergency service provision have generator power for only a few days.</li> <li>• The ability to use power-dependent durable medical equipment without electricity is limited.</li> <li>• Access to medical records is diminished.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to critical pharmaceuticals is diminished, and any pharmaceuticals requiring refrigeration will be spoiled.</li> <li>• Improper use of generators may lead to an increase in burns, carbon monoxide poisoning, and other related health impacts.</li> <li>• Surging rates of illness and injury are likely due to availability of potable water and wastewater treatment, medical supply chain disruptions, environmental exposure from loss of HVAC, panic induced violence, and accidents from diminished societal safety measures (i.e., traffic lights).</li> <li>• Increased rates of illness and other public health impacts due to the potential lack of availability of potable water, clean water for hygiene and sanitation, sanitary food preparation tools (cooking), and other related mechanisms of mitigating ingestion and exposure to pathogens.</li> </ul>
 <p>The icon consists of a blue circle containing a lightning bolt and a fuel pump nozzle. Below the circle, the text 'Energy (Power &amp; Fuel)' is written in blue.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bulk electric system will fail.</li> <li>• Fuel will need to be prioritized for distribution and use based on requirements such as the number of available generators, number of facilities requiring fuel or generators, and fuel consumption.</li> <li>• Pipeline operations may be degraded due to limitations in backup power.</li> <li>• Few gas stations have backup power for their fuel pumps, hindering the refuel of vehicles for the public and first responders.</li> </ul>
 <p>The icon consists of a blue circle containing a radio tower with signal waves emanating from it. Below the circle, the text 'Communications' is written in blue.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• System operators would likely not be able to maintain telephone, cellular, email, or dedicated broadband networks for communications.</li> <li>• Some responder communications would be affected immediately; others would last 24-72 hours based on backup power/fuel.</li> <li>• Communications infrastructure is likely to be damaged if equipment is cycling on and off.</li> <li>• Emergency response is greatly impeded with the lack of ability to communicate.</li> <li>• Communications backup power systems may fail with an extended loss of electricity.</li> <li>• Local radio and tv stations may not be able to broadcast, requiring the Joint Information Center (JIC) to identify non-traditional methods for providing public messaging.</li> <li>• Major exchanges and financial institutions will lose their robust communications networks and be limited in their ability to function.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure of Point of Sale terminals will necessitate cash transactions at the same time as access to cash from automated teller machines is seriously limited.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Traffic signals may be non-functioning, causing congestion on roads.</li> <li>• The ability to manipulate movable bridges will be lost; movable bridges will remain in the position they were at the start of the power outage.</li> <li>• There will be limited to no power for railroad switching and signals.</li> <li>• Public transit, traffic signal control, and tracking and routing (supply chain functioning) all have limited generator capacity, leading to system failure in an extended power outage.</li> <li>• Public transit and airports will lose ticketing and check-in abilities.</li> <li>• Traffic cameras and other surveillance tools will be inoperable.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct impact on HAZMAT/chemical facilities located in the region is expected, including impacts to HAZMAT/ chemical shipments.</li> <li>• Offsite power to nuclear plants would be lost.</li> <li>• Any facility requiring cooling would lose access to water supply.</li> <li>• Environmental issues that occur due to a long-term loss of power may include water contamination and spoilage of food sources.</li> <li>• Power outages and possible subsequent fuel shortages may impact the ability of municipalities to coordinate refuse pickup.</li> <li>• Autoclaves for treatment and disposal of infectious waste will be inoperable in facilities without power.</li> <li>• Standard reporting mechanisms for hazardous spills may be unavailable due to loss of communications.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Drinking water utilities will be hindered as many have limited backup power, leading to potential impacts on water pressure and quality.</li> <li>• Wastewater utilities will be hindered as many have limited backup power, leading to discharges of partially treated or untreated sewage.</li> <li>• Even after power is restored, some systems may need to be disassembled before they can be turned back on.</li> <li>• Any disruption to potable water sources for human and animal consumption, and access to clean water to use for</li> </ul>

	<p>appropriate sanitation and hygiene is a critical issue for public health, animal health, and food supply chains.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Impacts to private and public wells not part of a public utility are also expected.</li> </ul>
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C. Communications

1. ESF-2 (Communications) will coordinate communications support operations in accordance with [Annex 2](#) (Communications) of the SCEOP.
2. A listing of state-level communications systems available at the SEOC can be found in Section VIII (Disaster Intelligence and Communications) of the SCEOP [Base Plan](#).
3. Radio Communications
  - a. Radio officers and radio operators from supporting commissions, agencies, and departments remain under direct control of their own office when operating and maintaining state-owned equipment in any facility outside the SEOC.
  - b. Within the SEOC, radio operators will report to the State Warning Point Manager or Chief of Operations in his/her absence.
  - c. Radio procedures will conform to established FCC regulations and licensure for operating base or mobile radio stations. All communications over LGR and/or 800 MHz will be in “plain language” or “clear text.”
4. Telephone
  - a. When available, telephone is the primary means of communications between mobile and fixed locations.
  - b. During the initial phase of the disaster, forward deployed units and personnel will use mobile telephones extensively. Every agency must ensure they have adequate mobile telephone resources to support their communications for the first 72 hours of any event.
  - c. Subsequent operations may be conducted from fixed telephone devices once service has been established at required forward locations.
  - d. In the event telephone communications fail, Local Government Radio (LGR), the Palmetto 800 system, or other available radiotelephone networks will be used as the backup system until reliable telecommunications are restored.

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## VIII. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

### A. General

See Section IX (Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities) of the SCEOP [Base Plan](#) for the general roles and responsibilities of county, state, and federal agencies in preparation, response, and recovery from a disaster impacting the State.

### B. Emergency Support Functions

#### 1. ESF-1 (Transportation)

South Carolina Department of Transportation (Coordinating Agency)

- a. Maintain situational awareness of transportation impacts, to include fleet petroleum supplies, and provide sector assessments to the SEOC.
- b. Identify priority transportation assets for provision of back-up power generation and refueling.
- c. In coordination with ESF-16, facilitate movement of electric restoration crews to impacted areas.

#### 2. ESF-2 (Communications)

South Carolina Department of Administration, Division of Technology Operations (Coordinating Agency)

- a. Maintain situational awareness of state communications and public safety communication system impacts and provide sector assessments to the SEOC.
- b. Identify priority communication assets for provision of back-up power generation and refueling.
- c. Provide communication support to private-sector restoration crews.
- d. Facilitate communication requirements necessary to support establishment of service islands as situation dictates to support life safety.
- e. In coordination with the State Fiscal Accountability Authority (SFAA), maintain situational awareness and report on the state's ability to process state contractual obligations.

#### 3. ESF-3 (Public Works and Engineering)

- a. South Carolina National Guard (Coordinating Agency)

- (1) Maintain situational awareness of water and wastewater facility impacts and provide sector assessments to the SEOC.
    - (2) Identify priority water and wastewater facilities for provision of back-up power generation and refueling.
  - b. South Carolina Rural Water Association
    - (1) Maintain situational awareness of water and wastewater facility impacts and provide sector assessments to the SEOC.
    - (2) Identify priority water and wastewater facilities for provision of back-up power generation and refueling.
4. ESF-4 (Firefighting)

South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation  
(Coordinating Agency)

  - a. Be prepared to augment local fire departments and conduct firefighting operations as requested.
  - b. Coordinate available interstate or federal assistance in support of response and recovery operations.
  - c. Anticipate an increase in local demands for service as power is restored.
  - d. Support ESF-8 and ESF-10 when possible with emergency medical services and hazardous materials management.
5. ESF-5 (Emergency Management)

South Carolina Emergency Management Division (Coordinating Agency)

  - a. Establish, maintain, and share statewide common operating picture to facilitate situational awareness for all stakeholders.
  - b. Establish the Executive Group to provide executive oversight during LTPO response, to include prioritization of limited resources.
  - c. Convene the Disaster Intelligence Group (DIG) to provide analysis of cascading effects to lifeline sectors and other interdependent capabilities.
  - d. Coordinate response operations and provide resources to local authorities to protect life and property.

6. ESF-6 (Mass Care)
  - a. South Carolina Department of Social Services (Coordinating Agency)
    - (1) Identify locations to serve as mass care facilities.
    - (2) Maintain situational awareness of mass care impacts and provide facility/service assessments to the SEOC.
    - (3) Coordinate with ESF-13 and ESF-19 for augmented security at mass care facilities as required.
  - b. South Carolina Department of Public Health  
Identify locations to serve as medical needs shelters.
7. ESF-7 (Finance and Administration)  
South Carolina Emergency Management Division (Coordinating Agency)
  - a. In conjunction with the Logistics Section, coordinate contracts and procurement used to support the State's emergency response.
  - b. Coordinate support with the General Services Administration (GSA) as required.
  - c. Track costs associated with state activation and response for potential reimbursement.
8. ESF-8 (Health and Medical Services)  
South Carolina Department of Public Health (Coordinating Agency)
  - a. Maintain situational awareness of public health and healthcare impacts.
  - b. Identify priority medical facilities for provision of back-up power generation and refueling.
  - c. Coordinate the relocation of patients as needed to healthcare facilities in service islands with power.
9. ESF-9 (Search and Rescue)  
South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (Coordinating Agency)

- a. Be prepared to augment local search and rescue teams and conduct search and rescue operations as requested.
- b. Coordinate available interstate or federal assistance in support of response and recovery operations.

10. ESF-10 (Environmental and Hazardous Material Operations)

South Carolina Department of Environmental Services (Coordinating Agency)

- a. In conjunction with ESF-3, coordinate with water and wastewater utilities and share information regarding their plans to provide situational awareness to SCEMD and local emergency management agencies.
- b. Coordinate with hazardous materials facilities and share information regarding their plans to provide situational awareness with SCEMD and local emergency management agencies.

11. ESF-11 (Food Services)

a. South Carolina Department of Social Services (Coordinating Agency)

(1) In coordination with ESF-6, identify:

- (a) Locations of fixed feeding and distribution sites.
- (b) Number of persons in mass care facilities or service island areas in need of food.

(2) Coordinate with South Carolina Department of Agriculture for food safety standards, practices, and potential food threats as defined in the ESF-11 SOP and Annex.

b. South Carolina Department of Education

In coordination with ESF-6, identify inventory and availability of food supplies in impacted areas and locations designated as service islands.

12. ESF-12 (Energy)

South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff (Coordinating Agency)

- a. Coordinate with energy providers to maintain situational awareness of impacts and identify required state support to private-sector energy restoration efforts, including any relevant resource gaps.

- b. Maintain situational awareness and coordinate with the petroleum industry to identify supply-chain issues in the provision of commercial fuel supply and ability to support back-up power systems.
- c. Provide state liaison and coordination with energy providers during identification and establishment of service islands.
- d. Coordinate with SERT in identifying and establishing energy requirements.
- e. Monitor and report interstate and regional impacts that could adversely affect the provision and delivery of energy service.

13. ESF-13 (Law Enforcement)

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (Coordinating Agency)

- a. In coordination with ESF-12, local law enforcement and as requested by commercial fuel suppliers, provide augmented security for petroleum shipments.
- b. Augment local security as requested in areas identified as service islands.
- c. Identify priority law enforcement facilities for provision of back-up power generation and refueling.

14. ESF-14 (Initial Recovery and Mitigation)

South Carolina Emergency Management Division (Coordinating Agency)

- a. Coordinate with SERT partners and other SC Recovery Task Force member organizations to prepare for rapid deployment of resources necessary to implement initial recovery actions.
- b. Identify potential post-disaster mitigation strategies.
- c. Initiate development of a Joint Incident Strategic Plan with defined objectives and outcomes to guide recovery operations.

15. ESF-15 (Public Information)

South Carolina Emergency Management Division (Coordinating Agency)

- a. Identify and implement alternate, contingency, and emergency forms of communication to provide timely public information and warning to impacted jurisdictions.

- b. Develop and publish public information messages and themes to address concerns specific to LTPO.

16. ESF-16 (Emergency Traffic Management)

South Carolina Department of Public Safety (Coordinating Agency)

- a. In coordination with ESF-1, identify non-functioning traffic signals and transportation management systems and implement mitigating measures to facilitate non-disrupted traffic flow.
- b. In coordination with ESF-12, ESF-13, local law enforcement and as requested by commercial fuel suppliers, provide augmented security for petroleum shipments.

17. ESF-17 (Agriculture and Animals)

Clemson University Livestock Poultry Health (Coordinating Agency)

- a. Coordinate resources to support requests for assistance with animal, plant, and/or public health and agricultural issues during the LTPO.
- b. Collaborate with other food regulatory agencies in management of meat-poultry food safety issues to include programs to protect state animal product food production.
- c. Coordinate requests for outside resources which may include veterinary medical assistance teams, pre-designated humane organizations, and other qualified responders.
- d. Coordinate the State's eradication and control activities as required.
- e. Identify priority agricultural facilities for provision of back-up power generation and refueling.

18. ESF-19 (Military Support)

South Carolina National Guard (Coordinating Agency)

- a. Coordinate all valid mission taskings in support of current operations and general State operations and coordinate mission requests in support of other ESFs and local jurisdictions.
- b. Identify priority military facilities for provision of back-up power generation and refueling.

19. ESF-24 (Business and Industry)

South Carolina Department of Commerce (Coordinating Agency)

- a. Provide situational awareness with the private sector to facilitate risk-informed decision making.
- b. Gather information on specific private sector impacts to provide situational awareness for SCEMD and local emergency management agencies.
- c. Maintain situational awareness on the banking sector with particular interest in the institutions ability to process state contractual obligations.

C. Federal Support

Federal agencies such as the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and US Department of Energy (DOE) may provide a liaison to the SEOC in support of state response and recovery operations as requested.

**IX. ADMINISTRATION, LOGISTICS, AND FINANCE**

A. Administration and Finance

- 1. See [Annex 7](#) (Finance and Administration) to the SCEOP.
- 2. Stafford Act
  - a. A Stafford Act declaration enables the Federal Government to provide financial assistance to public entities, individuals and families, and certain private non-profit organizations.
  - b. According to FEMA’s [Power Outage Incident Annex](#), a power outage may qualify as an emergency under the Stafford Act.
  - c. Additional considerations for electromagnetic incidents:
    - (1) An electromagnetic incident may result in a Major Disaster Declaration if it is determined to be a natural incident.
    - (2) Any incident resulting in a long-term power outage, regardless of cause, may qualify for an Emergency Declaration.

B. Logistics. See [Attachment A](#) (SC Logistics Plan) to the SCEOP.

**X. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT (COG)**

See Section VII (Concept of Operations), Paragraph L (Continuity of Government) of the SCEOP [Base Plan](#).

**XI. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP)**

See Section VII (Concept of Operations), Paragraph M (Continuity of Operations) of the SCEOP [Base Plan](#).

**XII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE**

- A. SCEMD is the lead agency for the development, coordination, review, and update of this plan.
- B. Agencies with designated responsibilities will review and update this appendix on a biennial basis. The review will incorporate any updates from the National Response Framework (NRF), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Power Outage Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans, and other relevant state and federal guidance.

**XIII. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES**

- A. Authorities. See [Attachment C](#) of the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan.
- B. References
  - 1. South Carolina Energy Security Plan, 2022
  - 2. FEMA Region 4 Power Outage Incident Annex, 2024